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Article 5

THE MORAL BASIS OF LEGAL EDUCATION
AS IT RELATES TO HUMAN RIGHTS
Robert S. Pasley*
Introduction
In addressing myself to the topic, "The Moral Basis of Legal Education As
It Relates To Human Rights," I am reminded of the story told of one of
Harvard's famous professors in the days when the study of law there was truly
a "Spartan Education," in "Bull" Warren's
memorable phrase.' One day in class a student
was heard to murmur that he did not agree with
I
the outcome of a case then under discussion.
"And why not, pray?" "Because, sir," said the
luckless student, "this result doesn't seem just to
me." "Just!" thundered the professor, "You're
/
in the wrong building, boy. Go across the street
to the Theological Seminary if you want to hear
them talk about justice. Here we study law."
Even if this story is apocryphal, it is of a
piece with the disdain then felt by legal eduProfessor Robert Pasley
cators toward anything outside the confines of
the law, as they conceived it. For example, Langdell, in speaking of the rule that
an offer is accepted when the acceptance is deposited in the mail, stated that:
It has been claimed that the purposes of substantial justice, and the interests
of contracting parties as understood by themselves, will be best served by
holding that the contract is complete the moment the letter of acceptance
is mailed; and cases have been put to show that the contrary view would
produce not only unjust but absurd results. The true answer to this
2
argument is, that it is irrelevant ....
In fairness, it must be pointed out that Langdell then proceeded to assume the
relevance of the argument and to demonstrate that it could be used just as convincingly to support the opposite result, a conclusion which may or may not have
been justified. But it is clear that Langdell's real position was that a rule is a
rule, and that's that.
Few today would accept such a narrow conception of the law as a selfcontained system of more or less arbitrary rules. But although we talk bravely
of the social and economic factors which shape the law, and of the civic and
political goals which it seeks to achieve, we still use, by and large, the same teaching methods as those which were followed when these more narrow attitudes
prevailed. I refer primarily to the case method of instruction, but to other features
as well: the Socratic method, and the organization and structure of the orthodox
curriculum.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
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I do not propose that we scrap the case system and all that goes with it.
It has too many solid achievements to its credit to warrant any cheap denigration.
But after all it is almost a hundred years old and on this Centennial Celebration
of your distinguished law school some reappraisal might be in order. Again, a
new look at the standard curriculum might not be amiss.
In recent years, a great deal has been published on this general subject, and
I can do no more this morning than add another voice to those which have
already been raised. But beyond this, I am going to try to relate my remarks
to the moral basis of legal education and to the theme of these conferences,
human rights. I propose to do so under these headings:
(a) The purpose and function of legal education;
(b) Some deficiencies in the traditional approach;
(c) Some possible avenues of improvement;
(d) Training for professional responsibility;
(e) The contribution which legal education can make toward the better enforcement of human rights.
I. The Purpose and Function of Legal Education
It is a truism to say that the purpose of legal education is to qualify students
for the practice of law. This should not be understood in any narrow sense but
rather, in the words of Andrew D. White, spoken in 1887 in anticipation of
the establishment of my own school, Cornell:
Our aim should be to keep its instruction strong, its standards high
and so to send out, not swarms of hastily prepared pettifoggers, but a fair
number of well-trained, large-minded, morally based lawyers in the best
sense, who, as they gain experience, may be classed as jurists and become a
blessing3 to the country, at the bar, on the bench, and in various public

bodies.

I think it is significant that White, a layman, should have stressed the moral
basis of legal education at the very time when the established schools were thinking more in terms of exclusively professional training. Not that there is anything
wrong with professionalism. As a matter of fact, the first and most basic requirement of any legal education is that it turn out lawyers who are professionally qualified. For legal education to be moral, in any true sense of the word, it must be
solid, sound, and effective. Morality is not something to be sought outside of, or
superimposed on, a professional education. Much less is it something that can be
pursued independently of the reality to which it relates. Rather, the first requirement of morality in legal education, as in anything else, is that the education
process itself be sound and solid, capable of achieving its primary goal. So the
first question I think we should turn to is whether legal education, as now generally pursued, is in fact achieving this goal. A remarkable number of recent
observers have stated their opinion that it is not.'
3
4

White, The Law School, 59 CORNELL U. ANNOUNCEMENTS 9 (No. 23, 1968).
See generally A Symposium in Honor of Hardy C. Dillard: Legal Education, 54 VA. L.
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II. Some Deficiencies in the Traditional Approach to Legal Education
A. The Case System
Probably the greatest advantage of the case system is that it substitutes for
the mere presentation of a body of rules, to be mastered, organized, and perhaps
memorized, something of the stuff of life, the raw materials out of which these
rules emerge and on which they operate. As such, it cannot help but catch and
hold the interest of the student, at least in the first year. Its formlessness and
apparent lack of organization, so baffling to the beginner, are the very things
that force the student to organize his own materials, his own notes, his own
thoughts, in short to educate himself. Another advantage of the case system is
that it teaches, or should teach, the student to read and handle decided cases, a
skill which every lawyer must have, even in these days of widespread statutory
codification, and despite the declining force of the doctrine of precedent.
Undoubtedly there are other advantages of the case system, but I should
like to go on now to some of its disadvantages. First of all, the almost exclusive
preoccupation with the opinions of appellate courts means that the student is experiencing the facts at second or third remove, and he really gets little or no
experience with the handling of facts in their brute reality, or as first presented
in the trial court.
Secondly, preoccupation with appellate cases causes undue emphasis on legal
doctrine (even if that doctrine is not neatly prepackaged), as opposed to functional considerations. Neglected too are familiarity with trial court records,
administrative proceedings, and legislative materials.
Thirdly, under the case system the student receives inadequate training in
the everyday practical skills of the lawyer: counseling clients, negotiating agreements, drafting pleadings, wills, contracts, and other legal instruments, interviewing witnesses, trying cases, writing briefs, and arguing appeals.
Fourthly, and perhaps most serious of all, after the first year boredom and
apathy set in, the "second-year slump" occurs, the student loses interest in reading
cases, and tends to regard each successive casebook course as "more of the same."
B. The Socratic Method
Waiving for the moment the question whether this was really the method
Socrates used,' the time-honored dialogue between professor and student in
analyzing an assigned case or in arguing a hypothetical situation is probably the
REv. 583 (1968); Report of the Committee on Curriculum, 1968 AsS'N Amt. L. ScHOOLS
PRoc., pt. 1, § II, at 7-38; Roundtable on CurricularReform, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 387 (1968);
Symposium: The Teaching Process in Legal Education, 37 U. GIN. L. REv. 1 (1968); Freeman, Legal Education: Some Farther-OutProposals, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 272 (1965); Gellhorn,
The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1964); Haskell, Some
Thoughts About Our Law Schools, 56 GEo. L.J. 897 (1968); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203
(1943); Pasley, The Position of the Law School in the University, 16 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 34
(1966); Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965).
5 Cf. Rutter, Designing and Teaching the First-Degree Law Curriculum, 37 U. GIN. L.
Rav. 7, 27 (1968).
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most characteristic feature of American legal education and the one which sets
it off most from English and continental methods (and, for that matter, from
typical undergraduate teaching). In the hands of a master, it is a delight to
observe. The student being interrogated learns (if he learns at all) to be quick
of mind, sharp of tongue, precise in reasoning. He soon finds out that he cannot
"bull it through," that fallacious reasoning leads to disaster, that facile overgeneralizations are subject to prompt demolition. He learns too the joy of following an argument to its clear, logical conclusion, of testing his own mind against
that of the instructor, of sharpening his intellect, of improving his reasoning
power.
What then can possibly be wrong with it? Mainly this: it doesn't work
with everyone. Passing for the moment the question whether all teachers are
qualified to use it (manifestly, many are not; some do not even try), we must
ask what its effect is on the rank and file of students.
I have heard some of the current crop of students complain of the "drill
sergeant" tactics used by some devotees of the Socratic method. At first I was
inclined to put this down to undue timidity or softness on their part. But a recent
study by a psychiatrist, Dr. Andrew S. Watson, who is also a professor of law
at the University of Michigan, indicates that there is substance to the complaint.6
Dr. Watson believes that the Socratic method, while it may be effective with a
minority of the students, by its very aggressiveness tends to be extremely stressful
on the majority, arousing deep feelings of anxiety, and in some cases leading to
withdrawal from school, failure, or even a complete breakdown.' If this finding
is justified, it seems too high a price to pay. If in fact we are destroying some of
our students, and discouraging others, what becomes of the moral basis of our
legal education?
Another objection to the case system and the Socratic method, and one
closer to the subject matter of this address, is that the emphasis on legal doctrine
and the technique of legal argumentation tends to blind the student to the
ethical implications of legal problems and their solutions. At the 1956 Conference on the Education of Lawyers for Their Professional Responsibilities, sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools, the view was widely shared
that "the broad impact on problems of public responsibility of the legal profession, of movements in legal education since Langdell's institution of the case
method in 1890, was a negative one." s This result was attributed by many to
(1) the Socratic method, (2) the case system, and (3) the separation of law
and morals.9
Without going into the vexed question of the relation between law and
morals, which has been debated endlessly, suffice it to say that there is certainly
a connection between the two and that no solution to a legal problem, no study
of a field of law, can be considered adequate which does not give consideration
to the ethical and moral questions involved. To give just a few examples:
6 Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 91 (1968).
7 Id. at 119-22, 124-32. Cf. Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School,
1968 Wis. L. REv. 1201.
8 J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 79 (1959).
9 Id. at 82-84.
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Under what circumstances, if any, may criminal sanctions be imposed in the
absence of mens rea? Is racial or religious discrimination ever permissible? Conversely, to what extent can the move toward black separatism be justified ethicallv or morally? Can a legal code be devised to govern modem medical miracles,
such as heart transplants, without considering the moral questions of the meaning of life and death?
It would be an unfair exaggeration to say that such questions are ignored
in law school teaching. But to the extent that they are subordinated or lost
sight of in the pyrotechnics of the Socratic dialogue and the manipulation of
legal doctrine under the case system, then our system of legal education is failing
of its purpose of turning out "morally based lawyers in the best sense."'"
C.

The Curriculum

The standard law school curriculum has not changed its basic thrust since
Professor Beale proposed an ideal first-year curriculum in 1902." True there
have been changes. Some courses have been dropped - Equity and Agency
come to mind, and I am not sure that their loss has been altogether beneficial.
Others have been consolidated: Sales and Negotiable Instruments are now commonly taught together under the rubric "Commercial Law," using the Uniform
Commercial Code as the vehicle of instruction. This I think is to the good.
Exotic new courses have proliferated: Land Use Planning, Computer Science
and the Law, Government Contracts, to name but a few. They are all important
and room must be found for them somehow. But basically, the emphasis is still
on (1) substantive law, accounting for about two-thirds of the law school
program, (2) procedure (including evidence), accounting for perhaps one-sixth,
and (3) a few "cultural" courses like comparative law, international law, legal
history, and jurisprudence accounting. for the remainder.
I suppose my main grievance is not what this includes, but what it leaves
out or underemphasizes. Elsewhere I have suggested that this curriculum is at
one and the same time not sufficiently practical, nor yet sufficiently theoretical.
I have already adverted to the failure of the case system to train the student in
the practical skills of the lawyer. The standard curriculum fails equally, it seems
to me, to give the student an adequate conception of the rule and function of the
law in society, of its historical development, and of its philosophical implications.
Professor Julius Stone has observed that it is the duty of lawyers "to preserve
and advance the indispensable and enlightened cooperation in the maintenance
of fundamental democratic processes and forms, on which free government
depends."" I ask, how can they be expected to do this if their legal education
gives them no conception of what the law is about, or indeed why such an
institution as the law should exist at all?"
Before leaving this subject, I would like to say a few words about the tradi10
11
12
13
34, 44

See text accompanying note 3 supra.
Rutter, supra note 5, at 19.
J. STONE, supra note 8, at 19.
See Pasley, The Position of the Law School in the University, 16
(1966).

CATHOLIC

U.L. REV.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Centennial, 1969]

tional first-year curriculum. With all the changes, all the subtractions and additions, this has tended to remain fairly constant. It usually consists of five solid
blocks of so-called "fundamental" subjects: Contracts, Torts, Property, Criminal
Law, and Procedure. But how fundamental are these subjects really? How
much of what they cover is relevant to the lawyer's practice today? How much
is relevant to the basic needs of society?
It has recently been suggested that the bulk of the first-year course in
Contracts, centered as it is around the Restatement and Williston (offer and
acceptance, consideration, conditions, and so on) does not really deal with
the problems actually encountered by businessmen in their everyday dealings
or regarded by them as important."4 Moreover, with the advent of the Uniform
Commercial Code, there remains only a limited area where these concepts can
still operate in their common law form.
What of the course in Torts, with its emphasis on negligence law? If we go
to an automobile accident compensation plan, as seems inevitable, ninety per cent
of the area in which negligence is now significant will be swept away. In
Property, how relevant today are estates in land, riparian rights, easements,
and so on? In Criminal Law, has not the real focus of interest shifted from the
substantive law of crimes to the area of criminal procedure and of due process
for the accused, before, during and after trial?
Aside from the question of relevance, it seems to me that the major weakness of the first-year curriculum is that it tends to freeze the mind of the student
into the belief that these are the basic branches of the law, to which all else is
mere superstructure and recent addition. Inevitably, this colors his whole subsequent attitude toward his legal education, and even toward the law he encounters in practice. The overall effect is necessarily narrowing and stultifying.
III.

Some Possible Avenues of
Improvement

How can we make legal education a process which is more meaningful to
the student, a better preparation for his subsequent practice, a broader introduction to the needs and problems of society?
Although I have no blueprints, I do have a few suggestions. I would not
advocate abandonment of the case system, but rather less reliance on it, especially
after the first year. It needs to be supplemented with more generous use of the
problem method, of seminars, of trial moot court, of exercises in draftsmanship,
in counseling, in negotiation, and the other arts of the practitioner. How may
this be done, you ask, with our limited faculty and our even more limited resources of space and time? Frankly, I do not know, but I think it must be done.
Jerome Frank, in a persuasive article published over twenty years ago,
advocated just this approach." I think I can do no better than summarize some
of his recommendations and ask you to consider how seriously they have been
14 Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and Future,
1967 Wis. L. Rav. 805.
15 Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947).

[Vol. 44:1053]

THE MORAL BASIS OF LEGAL EDUCATION

1059

taken by our law schools and to what extent they have been put into practice.
He suggested first that a considerable number of law teachers be men with five
to ten years' experience in practice, including trial experience. 6 This used to be
the general rule in recruiting law teachers, but in recent years I have noted a
tendency, which I regard as regrettable, to recruit young men just out of law
school, or with a year or two of graduate work (which is usually more remote
from actual practice than is undergraduate legal education).
Secondly, he recommended that the study of appellate opinions be supplemented with the reading and analysis of complete court records, from the filing
of the first paper to the final disposition on appeal."
Thirdly, he urged that law school studies be supplemented by frequent
visits to the courts.'
Fourthly, he thought that every law school should have a legal clinic which,
in addition to the customary furnishing of legal aid, would take on other work,
including trials, for governmental agencies, legislative committees, and other
public bodies.'" Admittedly, a great deal has been done in this direction in recent
years, with the expansion of legal aid clinics, the increased emphasis on defense
of the indigent, the permission granted in some states (New York for example)
for law students to appear in court, participation by law students in neighborhood law offices, and so on. The fact remains that only a portion of the student
body participates in these activities, and they are generally considered less
prestigious than the law review and sometimes even than moot court.
All this is on the practical side. But I would not neglect (nor would
Jerome Frank) the theoretical. I think here that less emphasis should be given
to the details of the substantive and procedural law of the moment (most of
which will be bound to change very substantially during the student's professional career) and more to a study of those subjects which underlie the law and
give it its meaning, thrust, and significance. I think that every law student should
be required to pursue an integrated program covering such subjects as Jurisprudence, Legal History, Law and Society, Comparative Law, and International
Law, and that such studies should occupy at least one-fifth of his law school
program.2" Only in this way can students be expected to understand the role
and function of the law in society, its philosophic foundations and implications,
its goals and purposes. In short, only in this way can they learn to understand
the morality of the law and only in this way can legal education become truly
moral.
What of the standard first-year curriculum? I would like to see it completely
transformed so that the problems with which it dealt would be both more
realistic and more idealistic. Could not the course in Contracts, for example,
instead of manipulating a system of more or less artificial rules, try to show the
student the real role of the exchange relationship in business? As Professor

16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 1313-15.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1315-16.
Id. at 1316-18.
See Pasley, supra note 13, at 45-46.
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Malcolm Sharp has suggested,21 could not this course, from the very outset, show
the relationship between contract, agency, and the corporation, the interplay
between the common law rules and the Uniform Commercial Code, the contrast
between the old-fashioned bargain, freely arrived at at arm's length, and the modem contract of adhesion? Could not the course in Torts become a course in civil
compensation, treating of workmen's compensation and other forms of social
insurance, of fault versus non-fault liability, and of products liability, whether
based on notions of negligence, warranty, or strict liability in tort?
Could not the course drn Real Property emphasize the problems of land-use
control, the renewal of our cities, the elimination of the ghetto, and the relationship of landlord and tenant in our urban slums?
Could not the course in Criminal Law become a course in criminal procedure, with a thorough study of the recent Supreme Court opinions on due
process for the accused, police interrogation, the right to counsel, and so on?
Perhaps in the same course consideration could be given to problems of penology,
of the causes of crime, of rehabilitation of the offender, and so on.
Some introduction to civil procedure would still seem to be in order, and
it need not differ substantially from the course now commonly given, except
that in addition to reading cases, visits to the courts, preparation of records, and
argument of motions would make the subject come to life. In addition, a course
analyzing the role and processes of the courts, the legislatures, and administrative
agencies in creating and applying the law might well be in order.
Finally, I think the first year is not too soon to begin the program I have
suggested above of teaching the student something of the broader aspects of the
law. While various courses could be suggested here, I think Jurisprudence and
Legal History might better be reserved for the second or third year. An introductory course on Law and Society would seem more appropriate for the beginning student.
I have probably suggested more courses than could possibly fit into any first
year program. This comes down to a matter of selection. Here I am trying only
to make some broad suggestions for your consideration.
What of the Socratic method? I certainly would not advocate abandoning
it, but it might well be tempered to remove the element of fear, the "drill
sergeant" aspect of which students have complained. Dr. Watson, in the article
I have already mentioned, points out that Socrates himself used to reward his
students by praising them when they performed well.22 An expression of appreciation for a good answer would at least offset the scorn too commonly heaped
on the head of the luckless one whose answer is not up to par. Nor do I think
the Socratic method should be used, as it sometimes is, for the purpose of confusing and befuddling the student, with the calm assurance that six months from
now it will all become clear to him. In my opinion it is not necessarily a heinous
offense to provide the student with some answers, to outline a complex problem
for him, or to summarize the result of a line of cases.
21 Sharp, The Relevance of Contract Theory: A Symposium L. REv. 803.
22 Watson, supra note 6, at 123-24.

Introduction, 1967 Wis.
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IV. Training for Professional
Responsibility
We should never forget that, in educating our students, we are preparing
them to practice a profession. Dr. Watson points out that very little attention
has been given in the literature to the concept of professionalism, fundamental
though it is.23 He finds little to improve on Mr. Justice Brandeis's description
of the characteristics of a profession, which he paraphrases as follows:
1. It possesses a highly complex body of knowledge which may be gained
only after a lengthy education.
2. Because of the complexity of that knowledge, it is largely incomprehensible and untestable to the laymen for whose assistance it will be
utilized.
3. Because of this vulnerability of the client-patient, the professional owes
'his first duty to his subjects' best interests. The result is that all professions have a self-enforcing code of ethics.
4. Since the professional also derives his livelihood from his work, this automatically involves him in a conflict of interests.24 He must always subsume
this interest to the best interests of his client.
The most eloquent statement on professional responsibility which I have seen
is that promulgated in 1958 by the Association of American Law Schools
[AALS] Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, under the co-chairmanship of Professor Lon Fuller for the AALS and John D. Randall for the
American Bar Association [ABA]. The opening paragraph of this statement
deserves quotation:
A profession to be worthy of the name must inculcate in its members a
strong sense of the special obligations that attach to their calling. One who
undertakes the practice of a profession cannot rest content with the faithful
discharge of duties assigned to him by others. His work must find its
direction within a larger frame. All that he does must evidence a dedication, not merely to a specific assignment, but to the enduring ideals of his
vocation. Only such a dedication will enable him to reconcile fidelity to
those he serves with an equal fidelity to an office
25 that must at all times rise
above the involvements of immediate interest.
The statement goes on to point out the three major services performed by
the modem-day lawyer:
(a) In his role as advocate and counselor;
(b) As one who designs a framework that will give form and direction to
collaborative effort;
(c) Services
which run not to particular clients, but to the public as a
26
whole.

23 Id. at 132.
24 Id. at 133. Brandeis delineated these in BusINEss - A PROFESsioN 2 (1914).
25 Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, 1958 ASS'N Am. L.
SCHOOLS PROC., pt. 3, at 187-203.
26 Id. at 188.
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Probably it is the third of these that relates most closely to the subject matter of
this conference. Here the statement emphasizes the lawyer's loyalty, not to
persons, but to procedures and institutions, specifically his responsibility as a
guardian of due process. It is his duty, and the duty of the organized bar, to
make legal services available to all who need them. Moreover, the lawyer has
an obligation to concern himself with the reform and improvement of the law.
The statement concludes by declaring:
For understanding is not of itself enough. Understanding may enable
the lawyer to see the goal toward which he should strive, but it will not
furnish the motive power that will impel him toward it. For this the
lawyer requires a sense of attachment to something larger than 'himself.
For some this will be attainable only through religious faith. For others
it may come from a feeling of identification with the legal profession and its
great leaders of the past. Still others, looking to the future, may find it in
the thought that they are applying their professional skills to help bring
about a better life for all men.
These are problems each lawyer must solve in his own way. But in
solving them he will remember, with Whitehead, that moral education
cannot be complete without the habitual vision of greatness. And he will
recall the concluding words of a famous essay by Holmes:
"Happiness, I am sure from having known many successful men, cannot
be won simply by being counsel for great corporations and having an income
of fifty thousand dollars. An intellect great enough to win the prize needs
other food besides success. The remoter and more general aspects of the
law are those which give it universal interest. It is through them that you
not only become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject
with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law." 27
As a statement of goals and purposes, this cannot be surpassed. But how
do we train students to reach these high standards? I submit, only by providing
them with a sound professional and cultural education, such as I have tried to
outline above: one that will train them first, to be adequate, competent lawyers;
second, to see the law as a whole, in its historical, social, and cultural context;
and third, one that will inculcate in them a sense of duty and loyalty toward a
cause other than themselves, the cause of justice, so far as humanly attainable, for
all men everywhere. Specific courses, such as Jurisprudence, Law and Society,
Legal Ethics, and the Legal Profession can help in contributing toward this
goal. But nothing can take the place of a dedicated, hard-working faculty, who
by their example and devotion to duty, their concern with the welfare of each
individual student, and their own services to the causes of law reform, of defense
of the indigent, of improvement of the legal process in all its aspects, can demonstrate to their students what the teaching and practice of a profession means in
reality.28
It is encouraging to see that the Ford Foundation last year made a generous
grant to the newly created Council on Legal Education for Professional Re27

Id. at 202.

28 But see Smith, Is Education for Professional Responsibility Possible?, 40 U. CoLo. L.
REV. (1968).
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sponsibility [CLEPR], successor to the Council on Education in Professional
Responsibility, which was a joint -creation of the ABA, the AALS, and the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association. With these funds CLEPR will
make grants totalling approximately $950,000 per year to law schools interested
in making clinical or field work in the administration of justice a regular part of
their program.2" (From 1959 to 1968, a similar but smaller program has previously been financed by Ford Foundation grants to the Council on Educational
Responsibility and a predecessor organization, The Council on Legal Clinics.)
As the new and old Councils have stated in their 1968 Report to the AALS:
Clinical experience should contribute to legal education by bringing law
students and faculty directly into the life of the law in real roles. In doing
so, the programs should reinforce and broaden the existing social concerns
of certain law students and professors through direct confrontation with
injustice and misery; at the least the experiences should implant in all
participants a special sensitivity to the difference between justice and injustice which should serve a lawyer throughout the course of his life and
professional career: an awareness that lawyers have a special responsibility

for the better administration of justice for all citizens clients. 30

not just their

V. Legal Education and Human
Rights
How does all this bear on the central theme of these conferences, human
rights? Simply this, that we cannot expect law students to advance the cause of
human rights unless they are first awakened to their responsibility in this area.
On the whole, I think the record of the American bar on human rights has been
a good one, at least in recent years. But has the awakening come from their
legal education or from elsewhere? I submit that traditional legal education has
contributed only to a limited degree and that the main impetus has come from the
pressures of society, of organized groups, of the bar associations, of the government. It is time I think for the law schools to play their full part. Fortunately,
there are signs of change, on the part of individual law teachers, of contributors
to legal periodicals, and most heartening of all, from the students themselves.
It is customary to equate the term "human rights" with the rights of
minority groups, of the dwellers in the ghettoes and slums, of the accused
criminal, in short, of all the disadvantaged and oppressed classes in our society.
I have no quarrel with this use, but I would like to point out that, taken
literally, the term "human rights" refers to the rights of all human beings, not
merely the oppressed or downtrodden. Insofar as legal education deals with
rights at all, and obviously it does, it is dealing with human rights. By the same
token, the supposed dichotomy between personal rights and property rights
seems to me to be a false one. All legal rights, including rights in property, are
in the final analysis personal rights and therefore human rights. Nevertheless,
29 Report of Council on Education in Professional Responsibility and Council on Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility, 1968 AsS'N Am. L. ScHooLs PROC., pt. 1, § II, at
122-27.
30 Id. at 125-26.
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there is a sense in which these distinctions are valid. Certainly the need to
protect and advance the rights of the downtrodden and the oppressed is a crucial
one.
Up to now, I have argued that legal education can become more moral
by becoming more relevant and by preparing our students better for practice,
by giving them a broader understanding of the role and function of the law,
and by giving them a sound conception of their responsibilities as members of a
learned profession. But I think more is required if we are to prepare our students
adequately for the protection and advancement of human rights.
One of the complaints currently voiced by many students is that the present
law school curriculum is too heavily weighted with courses concerned primarily
with business matters or with the conservation and transmission of wealth. A
glance at the catalogue of my own law school shows that there may be some
basis for this complaint, at least in one respect. Disregarding for the moment
the first-year curriculum, about which I have already spoken at length, I count
in the second and third years six required courses, twenty-eight electives, and
twenty-six problem courses. Of the required courses, which necessarily take up
most of the second year schedule, all but one (Criminal Law) are business or
wealth oriented. However, when we move away from the required courses, the
situation improves somewhat. Of the twenty-eight electives, there are nine which
could be put in the business or wealth category and six which could be said to
deal with personal or human rights. Of the twenty-six problem courses, about
nine deal with business or wealth matters and about seven with personal or
human rights. (The remaining courses are either of a professional nature, such
as Procedure, or philosophical and cultural, such as Jurisprudence and Legal
History.) Except for the emphasis in the required second-year courses (which
we are considering correcting) this does not seem to be out of proportion.
The names of some of the courses now being offered in the area of human
and personal rights convey some idea of what we are attempting to give our
students: Law and Poverty, Civil Rights and Civil Disobedience, Consumer
Protection, Problems in Criminal Law, Problems of Urban Development,
Problems in Law and Psychiatry, and Social and Economic Aspects of Family
Law. I am sure that the situation is similar in other schools.
So I do not think it can be fairly said that our law faculties are ignoring
human rights. Much imaginative thinking and planning is being devoted to
acquainting law students with the problems and the ills of our urban society.
What is still lacking, I fear, is a sense of overall perspective, a curriculum which
will give the student a better understanding of the role of law in society, of its
moral and philosophical bases, of its goals and purposes.
There is another aspect of all this which so far I have not touched on
because its impact on, legal education is only indirect. It does nevertheless have
a very real and vital impact. I refer to faculty research and to the concept of the
law school as a law center, dedicated both to education in and improvement of
the law. It is not enough, it seems to me, for the faculty member to prepare his
case books and texts and to write articles for law reviews. His research, to be
meaningful and significant, must consider the broader implications of the
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strictly legal topics under investigation, and for this the help of the non-lawyer
specialist is essential. Time does not permit further development of this subject,
so I shall content myself with a quotation from a recent article by Professor Paul
Haskell of Case Western Reserve:
Can the study of trade regulation be meaningful without the consideration of ultimate economic consequences? Can the study of criminal responsibility be meaningful without the consideration of psychiatric and
moral factors? Can the study of zoning or urban renewal be significant
without the consideration of the sociological impact? Can the study of
slum and landlord responsibility be truly productive without the consideration of the economics of that area of commerce? Can the study of welfare
legislation be significant without the consideration of its impact upon the
recipient? Does not the study of divorce law call for the examination of
the socio-economic and moral factors involved? Does not the law dealing
with racial relations call for systematic study of the psychological -effects
of separation and mixing? There are innumerable examples. But, unfortunately, relationships between law teachers and specialists in other
disciplines are spasmodic. The non-lawyer has only occasionally been
brought into the curriculum or the research of the law school.
I look forward to the day when the law school ceases to be an independent division in the university structure, but rather is a specialized social
science division of the graduate school of arts and sciences. Needless to say,
this is not an immediate prospect, but until the law school seriously integrates its instruction and its research with the other relevant disciplines, the
law school will remain a cultural backwater, despite its vocational proficiency. 3'
A final thought on the subject of human rights is this: We must devise ways
and means of broadening the base of our legal education in terms of the students
who are admitted to it. A survey made a few years ago, sponsored by the National Opinion Research Center, demonstrated that most law students come from
middle and upper middle class backgrounds (a finding which should have
surprised no one) ." This is not just a matter of lack of financial resources, which
could be cured by more generous scholarship and loan programs. Much more
is it a matter of channelling: most children from poorer economic backgrounds
(and this includes most of our minority groups) are culturally disadvantaged to
begin with, come from homes where books and learning are simply not known,
and rarely set their sights for college or even a liberal high school education but
rather, when they simply do not become dropouts, tend toward vocational
schools.
One result is that the number of lawyers drawn from minority groups,
especially Negroes, is shockingly small. In an article which I commend to your
attention,3 3 Professor Leroy . Clark states that in the whole state of Mississippi
there are only eight black lawyers, and in the country as a whole only one per cent
of the lawyers are black. 34 The main thrust of Professor Clark's article is that
until there are more black lawyers, and an opportunity is given to them to join
31

32

33
34

Haskell, Some Thoughts About Our Law Schools, 56 GEO. L.J. 897, 905 (1968).
Cf. S. WARKOv & J. ZELAN, LAWYERS IN THE MAKING 2-3 (1965).
Clark, The Minority Lawyer: Link to the Ghetto, 55 A.B.A.J. 61 (1969).
Id.
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or work in close cooperation with large established law firms instead of struggling
to eke out an existence as single practitioners in the ghetto, adequate legal services
35
simply cannot be rendered to ghetto residents.
Admittedly, the law schools are now trying to remedy this situation by more
active recruiting among minority groups. The solution is not easy, because
academic standards must still be maintained, but a solution is desperately needed.
One interesting suggestion of Professor Clark's is that a program of postgraduate
legal studies, or continuing legal education, with generous provision of scholarship funds, be instituted for the benefit of single practitioners in the ghetto
whose prior education has been inadequate.'
Last year, the Council on Legal Education Opportunity [CLEO] was
established as a joint enterprise of the AALS, the ABA, the National Bar Association, and the Law School Admission Test Council. This has been described as
"a major commitment to expand opportunities for minority group members to
study and to practice law." 7 Already, CLEO has held four summer institutes,
each providing orientation and preparation for the study of law to forty Negro
and Spanish-American students. CLEO is now conducting a major evaluation
and examination of its first six months' work and a report is to be prepared this
Spring."
Certainly the challenge must be met.39 The right to an education, including
a legal education for those who are qualified, is as much a human right as any
other. And the other, more basic human rights of the ghetto dwellers and other
disadvantaged groups cannot really be satisfied simply on the basis of charity
or "legal aid." As a matter of human dignity and respect, there is also need for
a solid core of well-trained highly qualified lawyers drawn from and practicing
among the disadvantaged groups themselves.
Conclusion
The moral basis of legal education, as it pertains to human rights, involves
these elements, as I see it:
(1) A sound, effective, and relevant training in the skills of the practicing lawyer.
(2) A reasonably adequate treatment of selected areas of the substantive law.
(3) A placing of the law in its social and cultural context, with a
thorough consideration of its origins, goals and purposes.
(4) An awakening in the student of a sense of professional responsibility.
(5) Practical experience in legal aid and similar programs.
(6) Some intensive work in current problems of law and poverty, urban
35
36
37

Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
Report of the Committee on Teaching Law Outside of Law Schools, 1968
L. SCHOOLS PROC., pt. 1, § II, at 101.
38 Id. at 102.
39 See Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DuxE L.J. 1069.
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redevelopment, due process for the accused, and other areas of
human rights.
An intensive program of recruitment for legal education from
among disadvantaged groups, with provision for graduate and
continuing legal education for lawyers already practicing within
such groups.

Perhaps this is not so much a basis as a program. The moral basis of legal
education is, it seems to me, the same as the moral basis of the law itself, namely,
the pursuit of the virtue of justice. Justice has been variously defined: "To
each man what is due him,"4 and so on. But I like best Aristotle's definition:
Now Justice in this sense is in fact perfect Virtue - not justice in
the abstract, but as it is exercised between man and man. Hence we often
find it regarded as the sovereign virtue, "more wonderful than the Evening
or the Morning Star," and we have a proverb which says:
"All virtue is summed up in dealing justly." Justice is perfect virtue
because it practices perfect virtue.4"
I shall conclude these remarks with the wonderful verses in Deuteronomy on
justice:
Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates, which the
Lord thy God shall give thee, in all thy tribes, that they may judge the
people with just judgment,
and not go aside to either part. Thou shalt not accept person nor
accept gifts, for gifts blind the eyes of the wise, and change the words of
the just.
Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just, that thou
42 mayest
live and possess the land, which the Lord thy God shall give thee.

1.1.3.
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